R.I.P. SOPA: A Critical Analysis of the Discourse Surrounding the 2011 Failed Legislation by Litwak, Danielle








R.I.P. SOPA:  
A Critical Analysis of the Discourse Surrounding the 2011 Failed Legislation 
Danielle Litwak 










A senior thesis submitted to the Department of Communication Studies at the University of 
Michigan in partial fulfillment of the Bachelor of Arts degree (Honors) 
Thesis Advisors: Dr. Jimmy Draper and Professor Scott Campbell 
R.I.P. SOPA 1 
Acknowledgments 
Jimmy, I cannot thank you enough for the time, thought, and effort you put into this 
project. I would not have been able to do this without your feedback, sometimes harshly 
straightforward critiques (kidding!), and brainstorming sessions. You not only made this project 
what it is, but your efforts have also made me a better thinker, writer, and researcher. Though I 
am proud that this is finished, I will certainly miss our Wednesday meetings. They allowed me to 
express my concerns, remain accountable for my progress, and find humor throughout this 
rewarding yet sometimes frustrating journey. I appreciate everything you’ve done for me this 
past year. Thank you for your patience, thorough explanations, genuine interest in my work, and 
for making this massive endeavor seem much more feasible. 
Scott, thank you for always leading me toward the best resources and trusting my 
communication with Jimmy. I appreciate your dedication to the Communication Studies Honors 
Program as well as your flexibility and willingness to meet with students individually, ensuring 
our questions were answered and our needs were met. Thank you for holding us to a high 
standard and for always pushing us to produce our best work. 
Finally, a huge thank you to my biggest cheerleaders: Mom, Dad, and Lexi. You give me 
every opportunity to grow, personally and professionally. Thank you for always lending an ear 
when I need to talk things through or giving me space when I need to focus. I cannot imagine 





R.I.P. SOPA 2 




Historical Context: Copyright Protection Leading up to SOPA…………………………………..6 
Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………...10 
Methods…………………………………………………………………………………………..18 
“First Amendment Sunset Act” and Other Criticisms of SOPA…………………………………19 
“Internet Anarchy” and Other Reasons to Support SOPA……………………………………….24 














R.I.P. SOPA 3 
Abstract 
In 2011, the House of Representatives introduced the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), a 
controversial legislative attempt responding to persistent digital technology innovations and the 
popularity of Internet piracy. The failure of this act raises questions about the extent to which 
discussions of copyright legislation and proposed solutions to digital piracy reflect the 
relationship between media and technology industries. This study addresses such questions 
through a critical discourse analysis of SOPA’s media coverage. It finds that media industries, as 
advocates for the bill, were solely concerned with implementing a solution to intellectual 
property theft, while technology industries, which were the legislation’s most prominent 
opponents, feared the bill would be detrimental to the Internet’s structure and participatory 
nature. This study argues that proposals of copyright infringement solutions and the deliberation 
processes preceding them require the involvement and consideration of both media and 
technology industries – an irrefutable link that has been largely overlooked in existing academic 
studies on digital piracy legislation. Although this study focuses on one piece of legislation, it 
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Introduction 
The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries experienced a significant rise in 
controversy surrounding digital piracy issues. Entertainment executives feared that the rapidly 
evolving affordances of new digital technologies were facilitating illegal downloads of 
copyrighted content and, as a result, drastically reducing the industries’ revenues and profits. The 
Internet’s accessibility and growth as well as the digitization of media decreased consumers’ 
appetites for physical products, which are considerably more difficult to pirate than their online 
successors, such as compressed .mp3, .mp4, .mov, and .avi files. This technological shift, while 
beneficial in many ways for both media industries and its consumers, generated sizeable debate 
over ethical and economic consequences. For instance, the digitization of content enabled 
conservation of quality during reproduction and more efficient storage than analog media, 
simplifying the process of illegally replicating and distributing copyrighted material (Havens & 
Lotz, 2012). The industries’ concerns over this catalyst for digital piracy manifested in various 
legal repercussions, such as the enactment of new sanctions on technological developments, 
copyright laws, and numerous lawsuits against pirates. In 2011, the Senate introduced the 
PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), which was then followed by a similar House version of the bill called 
the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). Often collectively referred to as SOPA, these controversial 
bills ignited a debate between the media and technology industries, which ultimately led to the 
legislation being tabled.  
 Scholars have predominantly studied digital piracy from the perspective of media 
industries. Considering the positive or negative implications of illegally downloading media 
content, studies have most commonly analyzed the behavior’s financial consequences on 
entertainment businesses. Though copyright laws have been researched in terms of their 
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effectiveness in deterring digital piracy, scholars have only studied SOPA in regards to its 
technological repercussions. Evaluating the online protests that occurred in response to the 
proposed legislation, research on SOPA focuses almost exclusively on participatory websites 
(Yoder, 2012; Sell, 2013; Bessant, 2014; Konieczny, 2014; Loudon, 2014; Powell 2015). Noting 
how the Internet has given its users the opportunity to make connections and build communities 
without regard for geographic proximity, these studies show how online demonstrations 
prompted by the proposed legislation set a precedent for future protests and altered the structure 
of advocacy. With scholars largely treating the media and technology industries as distinct, this 
study highlights the need to consider both perspectives in tandem. The use of the Internet and 
technological devices to access entertainment content, both legally and illegally, has created an 
indisputable connection between the industries, yet this context has not been explicitly explored 
academically in terms of copyright law. This case addresses that void by analyzing both the 
media and technology industries’ arguments for and against SOPA, respectively. In doing so, it 
will assess the threats digital piracy poses to these industries and propose a more thorough 
approach to intellectual property protection. 
This study examines media discourses surrounding the SOPA controversy in an attempt 
to reveal the significance of both the media and technology industries’ roles in the digital piracy 
debate. Just as scholars have studied the analytical value of failed media production and what 
that can reveal about the operation of media industries (Punathambekar, 2009; Mayer, 2014), this 
case is similarly premised on the notion that failed legislation can demonstrate that the solution 
to digital piracy not only needs to effectively eliminate the illegal behavior, but must also do so 
in a way that accounts for all of the implicated parties. The failure of SOPA raises questions 
about the extent to which discussions of copyright legislation and proposed solutions to digital 
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piracy reflect the relationship between media and technology industries. This study addresses 
such questions through a critical discourse analysis of SOPA’s media coverage. It argues that 
because of the irrefutable link between the media and technology industries any efficient 
discussion of and solution to digital piracy, an act involving the use of an industry’s products 
(e.g., technology) to illegally access that of another’s (e.g., media), must work for both. Rather 
than attempting to implement any method that will effectively combat piracy, entertainment 
industries should be more mindful of the potential collateral damage their strategies pose. Future 
proposals of copyright infringement solutions and the deliberation processes preceding them 
require the involvement and consideration of both media and technology industries. Although 
this study focuses on one piece of legislation, it offers a useful model for thinking about debates 
in communication surrounding copyright law beyond SOPA. 
 
Historical Context: Copyright Protection Leading up to SOPA 
 In order to understand the significance of SOPA to developments in the digital piracy 
debate, it is important to first recognize the prior history of intellectual property protection. 
Alterations in law to keep pace with the advancement of technology initially occurred with The 
Copyright Act of 1976, which still poses as the basis of copyright law in the United States. It laid 
out the rights of copyright holders, extended the term of copyright beyond the life of the work’s 
creator to that plus an additional 50 years, and introduced the first explicit mention of “fair use,” 
an elusive doctrine that protects certain uses of copyrighted material without the owner’s 
permission or approval. Section 107 of the law states that reproducing or copying a copyrighted 
work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” should not be considered infringement, and 
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are therefore exempt from prosecution (The Copyright Act of 1976, 1992). The purposely vague 
language of fair use considerations has been extended to include more specific uses of 
copyrighted work through court cases and amendments, setting precedents for future conflict and 
technological innovation. Through various legal disputes over time, fair use has been granted to 
both audio copies of legally purchased content for “home use” and home video recording, 
protecting these uses from copyright infringement (Copying music and movies, 2003). More 
recently, critics of new copyright laws and defendants of digital piracy lawsuits argue that the 
regulations and prosecution, respectively, do not account for fair use, exercising the stipulation 
presented by the 1976 act to defend certain instances of piracy (Stim, 2017). 
 The life of copyright was prolonged again in 1998 with the Copyright Term Extension 
Act (CTEA), commonly known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act in reference to the Walt 
Disney Company as the legislation’s most active proponents. CTEA extended the life of a 
copyrighted work published in 1978 or later to the life of the work’s creator plus 70 years. 
Anything published on or before January 1, 1978, however, was still only covered for the term-
length prescribed by the Copyright Act of 1976 (The Copyright Act of 1976, 1992). The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 further amended copyright law in response to the 
expanding capabilities of the Internet. It revised and created sections of Title 17 of the United 
States Code, which laid the framework of United States Copyright Law, to officially criminalize 
the circumvention of government-implemented technological limitations intended to prevent 
online dissemination of copyrighted materials. This government practice, known as digital rights 
management (DRM), employs methods of restricting technological affordances from allowing 
users to pirate media content from the Internet (Schwabach, 2006). The details and provisions of 
CTEA, DMCA, and prior copyright legislation are commonly used as leverage for both the 
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prosecutors and defendants in court cases surrounding intellectual property protection (9-71.000 
– Copyright Law, n.d.). The language of these laws, though intentional to expand with the 
Internet and its affordances, was too broad to maintain reliable coverage to the satisfaction of 
media industry executives in the face of digital piracy’s growing popularity. 
Copyright legislation’s ambiguity became an increasingly notable problem for media 
industries around the new millennium, when Internet access was rapidly multiplying. The 
industries’ initial, and possibly most recognized, response to the widespread piracy of digital 
media, was the case of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (2001). A platform allowing its users 
to upload and download digital audio files using its extensive online library, Napster was a peer-
to-peer file sharing service that endorsed unlimited duplication of copyrighted material. This 
service permitted free access to products that otherwise cost money, posing a major economic 
threat to entertainment businesses. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the 
trade organization representing A&M Records, filed a federal lawsuit against Napster in 1999 for 
indirect copyright infringement, and in 2001, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately 
ordered the site to close (Langenderfer & Cook, 2001). The issue of online piracy, however, did 
not dissolve with Napster. Smaller file exchange services existed at the height of Napster’s 
popularity, and software creators have since developed others in numerous attempts to bypass the 
elusive copyright laws. As technology and the Internet continued to advance, peer-to-peer file 
sharing networks made use of new digital affordances and began enabling users to share media 
files containing not just music, but movies, games, books, documents, and even computer 
software as well. Though the Napster case resulted in severe consequences for the platform and a 
victory for entertainment industries, it did not create new legislation. Instead, the existing 
regulations, due to their deliberately loose wording, gave way to an open market for new peer-to-
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peer sharing services and the ensuing lawsuits filed against such host sites and the individuals 
who used them. 
 In an attempt to respond to the persistently innovative digital technology developments 
and the subsequent popularity of Internet piracy, the Senate proposed the PROTECT IP Act 
(Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act, 
or PIPA) on May 12, 2011. Just a few months later, on October 26, 2011, the House of 
Representatives introduced the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), a similar version of the bill, 
seeking severe punishments for websites facilitating pirating practices (Schatz, 2012). The 
legislation intended to expand the government’s power in combatting piracy, giving it the 
authority to not only impose regulations on web firms that enable access to illegal content, but 
also interfere with third parties, such as payment services, that conduct business with such sites. 
These bills, which ultimately failed, sparked significant reactions from both the media and 
technology industries, as advocates and opponents, respectively. Entertainment executives, who 
argued that the legislation was necessary for the survival of media industries, faced extreme 
opposition from websites and legislators that claimed the proposition violated free speech rights 
and previous copyright laws.  
The growth of the Internet expanded its participatory nature, making user-generated 
content more common, and therefore more difficult for sites and regulators to monitor. SOPA 
would have made it the responsibility of web firms to scan all of their users’ content for 
unauthorized use of intellectual property. Though the 2011 proposed bills attempted to make it 
explicitly legal to punish an entire platform for illegally hosting copyrighted content, rather than 
only incriminating the individual users who posted such material, rulings had previously been 
ambiguous on this matter. For instance, technology enabling consumers to record physical copies 
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of shows and movies that aired on television was deemed legal in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984). In 2001, however, Napster offered to modify its software to 
block 99.4% of its infringing material, yet the court upheld its decision to consider it an illegal 
service (Gray, 2012). In Sony v. Universal (1984), the technology was legalized despite having 
the capability of being used for illegal purposes, whereas in Napster’s case, the file sharing 
service was banned for enabling any amount of piracy. SOPA re-raised the question over 
whether a specific technology or website could be prohibited for facilitating the illegal 
circulation of intellectual property when such use only constitutes a small percentage of its 
overall purpose. Advocates maintained that sites be held accountable for unlawfully hosting any 
copyrighted content, while opponents fought this stipulation as one of the bill’s largest flaws. 
The legislation revealed ethical and economic concerns from both media and technology 
companies, prompting such a significant controversy that it resulted in the bill being tabled, and 
thus the first legislative defeat for copyright holders in 30 years (Sell, 2013). 
 
Literature Review 
 Scholars have studied the development of piracy and its consequences in many ways. 
While most studies frame free peer-to-peer file sharing services as having negative impacts on 
the economy, specifically on entertainment industries, scholars are not unanimous on this 
perception. Some research on copyright infringement has suggested that the illegal practice can 
potentially be beneficial for media industries. This literature often accuses media executives of 
misconstruing data in an attempt to present the effects of digital piracy as worse for business 
practices than they are. In their Digital Economy Act (DEA) policy brief, Cammaerts, Mansell, 
and Meng (2013) argue that media industries’ efforts to combat piracy are misguided since they 
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are mainly based on revenue streams of CDs and vinyl records, which have naturally dropped 
following the digitization of media content. The work shows that overall profits have stagnated, 
finding no evidence for the “drastic decline in revenues warned of by the lobby associations of 
record labels” (p. 7). Aguiar and Martens (2016) reaffirm these results in their analysis of 
clickstream data, noting that legal purchases of music have remained relatively stable in the face 
of digital piracy. These studies concluded that illegal downloads of creative content have had 
minimal, if any, negative financial impact on media industries. 
 Further, research suggests that digital piracy has made beneficial contributions to 
copyright holders and other industries involved in media content sales. Drawing on academic 
literature about the illegal act, Herjanto, Gaur, Saransomrurtai, and Quik (2014) determine that 
piracy can be an effective publicity vehicle, allowing consumers to find content they would not 
have otherwise encountered and often leading them to legally purchase it. Studies also offer 
evidence that file sharing services can promote unknown artists, giving them the opportunity to 
be discovered (Piolatto & Schuett, 2012; Lee, 2016), while others cite the benefits copyright 
infringement has in reinforcing retail popularity for artists signed to major labels (e.g., 
Hammond, 2014). Herjanto et al. (2014) also found that piracy has positive effects on digital 
businesses due to increased product diffusion. For instance, the software that pirates use to 
illegally download content creates “high product awareness and [influences] potential 
customers” to purchase it (p. 316). Similarly, in his survey to determine the effect intellectual 
property theft has on iPod profits, Leung (2015) argues that digital piracy increases sales of 
music complements. Researchers have found that online copyright infringement is not only 
inconsequential in regards to media industries’ revenue, but it can also have a positive impact on 
music artists and the sales of technology products.  
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The vast majority of digital piracy studies, however, analyze the negative industrial and 
cultural implications of the illegal behavior. Similar to Sinha and Mandel’s (2008) theory that 
negative incentives, positive incentives, and consumer characteristics can often predict an 
individual’s likelihood to pirate music, studies on the detrimental effects of digital piracy can 
typically be grouped into one or more of these same three classifications. First, research on 
legislation and lawsuits to punish pirates tend to frame such responses to copyright infringement 
as negative incentives. Second, studies focusing on industry shifts toward new platforms that 
make content more accessible to consumers can be categorized as positive incentives.  Finally, 
literature that identifies how social norms have made piracy less taboo often attempt to create a 
profile of those most likely to illegally download media content based on consumers’, or pirates’, 
common traits and characteristics. 
 Scholars focusing on the impact of digital piracy legislation generally discuss the 
efficiency of using negative incentives, such as lawsuits and other threats of punishment, to deter 
people from stealing intellectual property. Upshaw and Babin (2010), in their survey of young 
adults’ music listening and downloading habits, found that while lawsuits are the largest 
deterrent to copyright infringement when compared to other negative incentives, their impact is 
relatively negligible on the amount of digital piracy as a whole. The study found that lawsuits not 
only “have little effect on consumer behavior,” but they are also “financially detrimental to the 
industry and potentially not worthwhile” (p. 24). Citing the lawsuits filed by the RIAA against 
culpable individuals, universities, and companies, Upshaw and Babin’s work supports the idea 
that although these court cases slightly reduced digital piracy, industries lost more money 
pursuing them than they gained in resulting music sales. Additional research found that lawsuits 
and other policies aiming to severely punish a small percentage of digital pirates are ineffective 
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in discouraging people from illegally accessing media content (Lyonski & Durvasula, 2008; 
Zhang, Smith, & McDowell, 2009; O’Shea. 2013, Geng & Lee, 2013). In their survey of college 
students, Zhang et al. (2009) found that respondents were less likely to pirate music only when 
they perceived punishment to be certain, and the severity of a potential consequence had no 
significant correlation to an individual’s likelihood to illegally download copyrighted material. 
These studies defend the notion that the high costs and relatively small number of lawsuits make 
them unsuccessful in reducing the rate of digital piracy. 
Literature on copyright legislation has also reflected concerns about the constitutionality 
of such regulation (Chemerinsky, 2002; Shue, 2005; Belleville, 2012; Thomas, 2013). In a case 
study of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Chemerinsky (2002) argues that prolonging 
the life of copyright violates the American right to freedom of expression. Citing the fact that the 
protection of intellectual property “exists to encourage the creation and distribution of more 
speech,” he contends that extending copyright terms “does not serve that purpose because it 
applies only to speech that already exists” (p. 97). Similarly, Belleville (2012) conducts an 
analysis of SOPA to explain the primary issues raised by the bill’s opponents. Identifying the 
ramifications of expanding the government’s role in combating piracy, the study pinpointed legal 
concerns over due process, First Amendment rights, censorship, and the potential to impede 
Internet innovation and the development of technology companies. While opponents of the 
proposed law often agree that piracy is an issue, they believe that these harsh legislative reactions 
fail to solve the problem and infringe on human rights in the process. Digital piracy studies that 
focus on legislation, or negative incentives, demonstrate that not only have such laws been fairly 
ineffective in deterring the illegal practice, they have also produced a significant amount of 
resistance and controversy that may not justify the marginal benefit. 
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Other research suggests that providing consumers with a more favorable alternative to 
illegally downloading content is more effective in reducing piracy than negative implications. 
This proposed shift in entertainment industries’ practices would offer consumers a positive 
incentive, such as a legal new platform to access content, that would have the low cost and easy 
accessibility that make piracy more attractive than the current means of legal media 
consumption. Studies have found that this recommendation can be effective in reducing digital 
piracy (Hill, 2007; Lyonski & Durvasula. 2008; Hofmeister, 2010; Briggs, Eiermann, 
McNamara, & Hodson, 2014; Akulavičius & Bartkus, 2015). In their field study at a university, 
Lyonski and Durvasula (2008) came to the conclusion that “piracy can be likened to a two-
pronged approach: the carrot vs the stick.” With legislation as the “stick” approach and positive 
incentives as the “carrot” approach, the study found that “a more attractive business model is 
needed” to change pirates’ habits (p. 175). In providing a more desirable alternative to digital 
piracy and current law-abiding platforms, media industries could give consumers a legal, yet 
appealing way to consume content. 
A successful shift in industries’ practices would have to be toward a medium that allows 
consumers to access content with the benefits that make digital piracy alluring. Preferring the 
convenience, economic benefits, and unlimited library that digital piracy affords, scholars have 
found that consumers are likely to gravitate toward new industry models that offer such 
advantages. In his effort to identify the causes, consequences, and strategic responses to 
copyright infringement, Hill (2007) affirms the importance of copyright holders to “embrace the 
technology used by pirates (such as peer-to-peer networks)” by offering subscription services (p. 
20). In a more recent study, Akulavičius and Bartkus (2015) praised Spotify, one of the music 
streaming services that pursued this suggestion, for offering a more favorable alternative to 
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piracy as well as other legal platforms. Not only preserving the quality of content that illegal 
downloading does not guarantee, streaming services also offer a cheaper option than a la carte 
services, such as iTunes and Amazon, which require its consumers to pay a fixed price per song 
or video. Further, the researchers claim that “Spotify has the biggest potential for . . .  becoming 
the leading business model in the digital music market” (p. 17). Briggs et al. (2014) also argue 
for this continued entrepreneurship of intermediary platforms to reduce piracy. They found that 
streaming services, like Pandora and Spotify, assisted in decreasing the amount of digital piracy 
as well as increasing the legal consumption of music. Though such services have not successfully 
eliminated digital piracy, they have benefited both the consumers and industries while managing 
to subdue illegal methods of obtaining music. This shift in music industries’ practices, providing 
an alternative means of content consumption, has acted as a positive incentive to the reduction of 
digital piracy. 
There are also many studies that aim to identify common traits and characteristics among 
pirates in order to devise a solution that would best target the most likely culprits. The 
widespread practice and popularity of digital piracy among entertainment consumers has made 
this illegal behavior a societal norm, reducing fear of negative incentives and contributing to the 
high frequency of copyright infringement. Most studies attempting to propose a distinguishing 
characteristic or quality that could predict whether a person is likely to pirate media content have 
focused on people’s ethical perceptions of piracy (D’Astous, Colbert, & Montpetit, 2005; 
Schultz, 2006; Cronan, & Al-Rafee, 2007; Lyonski & Durvasula, 2008; Coyle, Gould, Gupta & 
Gupta, 2009; Gray, 2012). There is also research, however, on whether gender (Tjiptono, Arli, & 
Viviea, 2015) or religious teaching (Casidy, Lwin, & Phau, 2017) influences a person’s attitude 
toward the practice, as well as the individual’s estimation of the risk involved (Vida, Koklič, 
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Kukar-­‐Kinney, & Penz, 2012). In her examination of pre-existing literature, Gray (2012) 
demonstrates that the public generally does not find moral issue with digital piracy, and in fact, 
views it as a cultural norm. Moreover, Schultz (2006) discovered that social values not only 
influence an individual’s behavior more than their learned knowledge of ethics, but actually 
shape their standards of ethical behavior as well. With an individual’s actions directly affected 
by his or her understanding of social values combined with the notion of digital piracy as a 
cultural norm, it is no surprise that copyright infringement has become such a widespread issue. 
These studies attempt to construct the profile of likely offenders in order to target the individuals 
or groups that need to revise their view of intellectual property theft as ethically and socially 
permissible. 
Scholars argue that distributing information that explains the detrimental repercussions of 
digital piracy on entertainment industries could resolve the misguided perception of the illegal 
behavior. Gray (2012) advocates for a response to this cultural acceptance of copyright 
infringement, encouraging entertainment industries to “further educate the public about the 
losses to artists . . . in order to brand it as a crime with a victim,” and suggesting that “education, 
as opposed to punishment . . . may be the more effective preventative measure” (p. 291). Cronan 
and Al-Rafee (2007) also contend that society needs to learn about the effects of digital piracy on 
artists and media companies. Studies focusing on the demographics and characteristics of typical 
intellectual property thieves often found that to eliminate piracy, entertainment executives must 
inform the public of the illegal behavior’s detrimental implications. Providing culprits with an 
understanding of their actions’ consequences will help shift the culture away from copyright 
infringement as a social norm and subsequently alter the ethical component of digital piracy to 
make it less acceptable, and thus frequent.  
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Excluding the aforementioned literature by Belleville (2012), in which he performed a 
case study on the constitutionality of the legislation, SOPA research has typically taken a 
networked approach in examining how the online demonstrations started by participatory 
websites have established a new form of activism. Through analysis of literature on social 
movements and networks, Sell (2013) frames Wikipedia and Reddit’s protests against SOPA as 
having “reduced barriers to collective action and the huge numbers of participants” (p. 81). The 
ability of users to collaborate with individuals outside of their geographic vicinity has enabled 
online sites and networks to change social movement practices by creating new advocacy 
techniques and exponentially increasing their power in numbers. Noting the anonymity that 
participatory websites afford, Powell (2015) predicts that the Internet’s position as a medium for 
the organization of protests can have exceptional, yet potentially threatening consequences for 
the future of activism and the participants involved. In a case study on SOPA, Bessant (2014) 
investigates these new advocacy methods with the presence of e-businesses such as Google, 
Wikipedia, and Facebook. She argues that the online rallies caused the bill to fail because the 
individuals behind the Internet platforms had the necessary background knowledge to understand 
the practical and political implications of the proposed legislation that proponents such as policy 
makers and industry executives were lacking. This literature on SOPA focuses exclusively on 
online communities and how their use of the Internet’s features to produce a massive organized 
reaction to the legislation set a precedent for future protests. 
While there is extensive research on the positive and negative effects of copyright 
infringement on media industries and many studies on the technology industries’ use of 
participatory websites to protest SOPA, there is a general lack of literature on digital piracy 
legislation that analyzes the perspectives of media and technology industries together. This study 
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attends to this gap by evaluating how news and trade press publications have framed the SOPA 
controversy as it is relevant to both sides. Consideration of the debate from this angle will reveal 
the direct importance of each industries’ values and priorities in determining an effective 
solution to digital piracy.  
 
Methods 
This study aims to capture a comprehensive view of the digital piracy issue and account 
for the perspectives of both the media and technology industries. To do this, I conducted a 
critical discourse analysis of the SOPA coverage in five news sources: The New York Times, The 
Hill, Billboard, Daily Variety and The Hollywood Reporter. The New York Times covers issues 
related to media industries from both the consumer and business sides. The Hill offers political 
commentary on current events, politics, policy, business, and international affairs. Billboard, 
Daily Variety, and The Hollywood Reporter are trade press sources that specifically cover 
entertainment news. Through a keyword search of “Stop Online Piracy Act,” I gathered all 
coverage of the legislation from these publications during the 15 months following the SOPA 
proposal, spanning October 2011 (the month of SOPA’s introduction) to January 2013 (when 
coverage of the issue significantly slowed). In each of the 100 articles (28 from The New York 
Times, 28 from The Hill, 7 from Billboard, 23 from Daily Variety, and 14 from The Hollywood 
Reporter) I looked specifically at how the publications presented the way media and technology 
industries as well as the legislators and lobbyists on either side discussed the proposed 
legislation.  
I then coded and analyzed the data using grounded theory, inductively developing 
categories to organize the results (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Grouping the information by 
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opposition or support for SOPA and then further by legislators, entertainment industries, 
technology industries, and consumers, I developed a total of five broad classifications to most 
clearly capture the varying perspectives on the legislation (Legislator Opposition, Technology 
Opposition, Legislator Support, Entertainment Support, and Consumer Opinion). Within each of 
these classifications I constructed a database to organize the information based on its general 
message (e.g., survival of the industries, economy/jobs, free speech, unreasonable burden) as 
well as the individual and/or group relaying it (e.g., Google, RIAA, Lamar Smith [R-TX], Chris 
Dodd). In evaluating the data, I noted the frequency of the arguments used for and against SOPA 
as well as the sentiments expressed by either side at different points of the legislation’s timeline. 
This analysis revealed three distinct aspects of the debate: opposition to SOPA, the response 
advocates had to the opposition, and the discussion between both sides following the bill’s 
failure. 
 
“First Amendment Sunset Act” and Other Criticisms of SOPA 
“Student warning! Do your homework early. Wikipedia protesting bad law on 
Wednesday! #SOPA.” Using Twitter’s 140-character limit, Jimmy Wales, Co-Founder of the 
free online encyclopedia, informed Internet users of his plan to shut down Wikipedia in protest 
of SOPA. Though further explanation for his opposition to the anti-piracy bill was not offered in 
the tweet, visitors of the site on January 18, 2012, were prohibited access and instead prompted 
to “Imagine a World Without Free Knowledge” as well as given a link to more information about 
the legislation “that could fatally damage the free and open Internet” (History Wikipedia 
English). Citing this blackout as well as the similar online protests subsequently executed by 
other web firms such as Google, Reddit, Mozilla, and Flickr, media coverage of the bill 
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demonstrates that technology industries as a whole held similar concerns about the legislation. 
The publications analyzed in this study attribute arguments of unintended consequences, 
unreasonable burden, stifled innovation, and free speech to SOPA’s opponents, who worried that 
the rushed legislation would have had devastating impacts on the future of the Internet’s 
landscape and development. 
The technology firms and legislators that opposed the bill feared that, in its attempt to 
eliminate websites that illegally host copyrighted material, SOPA’s language was so broad that it 
would have led to unintended interpretations and, thus detrimental consequences. According to 
The Hill, search engines such as Google and other law-abiding technology firms claimed that the 
ambiguity of the bill would have granted legislators the ability to interpret it in ways that “could 
[have led] to legitimate websites getting shut down” (Sasso, 2012a, para. 2). Participatory 
websites that unknowingly host user-generated content incorporating copyrighted material, 
which are protected by the safe harbor provision of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 
would have risked facing serious implications, such as lawsuits or government-imposed 
restrictions to user access. Though Google and Wikipedia were referenced the most, mentioned 
in about 25% of the articles reviewed, sites such as Yahoo, Facebook, and Reddit were also cited 
a number of times as lawful firms that felt “this bill [went] too far in giving the government and 
copyright holders the power to shut down websites just because they [believed] they [were] 
mainly about piracy” (Block, 2011, para. 8).  
According to technology industries, SOPA would have given the government too much 
power in its ability to interpret the bill. In doing so, this would have likely led to the destruction 
of Internet business models by allowing “movie studios . . ., patents and copyright trolls and any 
holder of an intellectual property right to target lawful U.S. websites and technology companies” 
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(Nagesh, 2011a, para. 2). This potential stretch of the vague language, whether deliberate or 
accidental, could have resulted in law-abiding sites being forced to cease operation as collateral 
damage from the entertainment industries’ rushed attempt to stop online copyright infringement. 
Legislators and activists that supported technology industries in their effort to crush the anti-
piracy bill similarly argued for the preservation of the Web, hoping that “lawmakers [would] not 
impede the growth of the Internet . . . by passing laws that aim to . . . unnecessarily target content 
providers and search engines in an arbitrary and capricious manner” (Corbett, 2012, para. 4). 
Opponents frequently regarded the potential of SOPA’s ambiguous language to be extrapolated 
onto legal sites that unintentionally host or facilitate access to pirated content as one of the 
legislation’s biggest threats to web firms. 
 Technology industries further resisted the bill based on the financial and logistical 
burdens it would have imposed on websites. SOPA would have made it the responsibility, and 
thus liability of participatory platforms allowing user-generated content to ensure that their 
enabling features were not used for copyright infringement. Likening this regulation to “China’s 
system of corporate ‘self-discipline,’” the New York Times argued that such a demand “would 
[have created] daunting financial burdens and legal risks” (MacKinnon, 2011, para. 7). Activists 
supporting the technology industries’ position similarly argued that websites facilitating access 
to infringing material or sites through the innovative and convenient feature of linking, would 
have had to “play policeman” (Weisman, 2012, para. 20) and eliminate such connections or else 
face “a court order [forcing] them to take action” (Johnson, 2011c, para. 6). According to Google 
executives, this attempt to “shackle the Internet with regulations” could have imposed 
detrimental consequences on web firms of all sizes and on the developing structure of the 
Internet as a whole (Nagesh, 2011b, para. 1). Larger companies, such as Google and YouTube, 
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that already employed strategies for locating and removing unauthorized usage of copyrighted 
material would have had to strengthen these procedures or confront the inevitable legal 
repercussions. Smaller organizations, such as start-ups, would have had to re-allocate their 
limited resources to prioritize monitoring content. This threatened obligation would have been 
impossible for larger companies and hindered the growth of smaller ones that would have had 
difficulty surviving the financial liability at all. Moreover, according to technology industry 
advocacy groups, the bill would have been “an alarming step backwards in Internet policy,” 
demanding that “third parties, including payment processors and online ad networks, cut ties 
with [rogue] sites” (Nagesh, 2011a, para. 1-2). Opponents of SOPA were confident that the 
legislation would have imposed undue stress in the form of supplementary regulations and 
liabilities on not only many web firms but on unrelated industries as well.  
Technology industries and other opponents also felt that SOPA threatened to stifle 
innovation on the Internet. According to The Hill, Google Chairman Eric Schmidt warned that 
SOPA would have “[criminalized] linking and the fundamental structure of the Internet itself,” 
noting the potential detriment the bill would have had on websites’ business models (Sasso, 
2012a, para. 2). Removing such a key feature would have impeded search engines and other 
major sites’ ability to connect users to unknown start-ups. Further, this limitation would have 
made it difficult for newer sites to reach popularity, would have discouraged corporate 
innovation on the Internet, and according to Mitt Romney during his quest for presidency, would 
have had a “depressing impact on one of the fastest growing industries” (Daunt, 2012, para. 4). 
The New York Times claimed that the burdens imposed would have made it “much harder for 
brilliant young entrepreneurs with limited resources to create small and innovative Internet 
companies that empower citizens and change the world” (MacKinnon, 2011, para. 7). Fearing 
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the conceivable risk to the structure of the Web, the opponents felt as though the bill favored the 
innovation of entertainment industries by protecting intellectual property, while inhibiting the 
growth and development of technology industries.  
The new policing requirement would have also had a prohibitive impact on user-
generated content. In an effort to prevent additional legal costs, many activists argued that 
participatory sites would have probably approached the removal of potentially incriminating 
posts with an overly cautious attitude by taking down anything that resembled copyrighted 
material and thus “[crippling] innovation in one of the most vibrant sectors of the American 
economy” (Weisman, 2012, para. 20). Video game industries, which often require its users to 
create new content through interactivity and encourage participants to post videos demonstrating 
their skills and accomplishments, were especially concerned about this aspect of the proposed 
bill, claiming it would have “shred the Internet” and “[led] to gross abuse” of technology 
companies (Gaudiosi, 2012, para. 11). Google and Facebook executives made similar claims, 
contending that the bill would have “hurt the average Internet user or [interfered] with their 
online activities” (Wortham, 2012, para. 19). Technology industries and their legislative activists 
rejected SOPA due to the harmful implications it would have had on the Internet’s development 
and general landscape as a participatory communication medium. 
In discussing how the bill would have stifled innovation, activists argued that SOPA 
violated the American right to freedom of speech by forcing sites to censor its users. Referring to 
the legislation as the “First Amendment Sunset Act,” Clay Shirky, author and NYU professor, 
expressed his frustration with the bill to a Daily Variety reporter by claiming that advocates 
“can’t just shut [Internet users] up if [they] don’t like what they’re saying” (Johnson & 
Thielman, 2012, para. 8). SOPA’s opponents worried that by criminalizing Internet features 
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(e.g., user-generated content, linking), forcing web firms to monitor and remove pirated content, 
and prohibiting third parties from conducting business with sites that facilitate access to 
copyrighted material, the legislation violated free speech rights. Arguing that the proposed 
regulations would have created an overly cautious and subsequently censored environment, they 
feared that either content monitors would have posed excessively strict standards to avoid 
potentially incriminating content or users would have refrained from posting at all. The White 
House, though a consistent advocate for the reduction of copyright infringement, similarly 
expressed concern that the legislation would have constrained the openness of the Internet and 
released a statement saying, “any effort to combat online piracy must guard against the risk of 
online censorship of lawful activity” (Nagesh & Sasso, 2012, para. 2). Technology industries as 
well as activists and legislators who opposed the bill worried about the future of the Internet and 
the potential detriment SOPA could have had on website users’ freedom of speech and 
expression.  
 
“Internet Anarchy” and Other Reasons to Support SOPA 
On October 26, 2011, the same day SOPA was introduced, the American Federation of 
Musicians (AFM), American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA), Directors 
Guild of America (DGA), International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture 
Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and Canada (IATSE), 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), and Screen Actors Guild (SAG) released a joint 
statement on the benefits they believed the legislation would have had. In it, these Guilds and 
Unions, which represent the talent who create and promote the music, movies, television shows, 
and plays that comprise the American entertainment industries, claimed: 
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This legislation . . . will provide U.S. law enforcement agencies with the tools to protect 
American intellectual property . . . from foreign rogue websites that knowingly and 
deliberately engage in the illegal distribution of our content for profit. Left unchecked, 
these rogue websites threaten the vitality of the online marketplace by stealing the work 
of American innovators and undermining legitimate business. They profit by offering 
access to content that they had no role at all in creating or financing, and they threaten 
real jobs . . . of [people] whose livelihoods are dependent on the economic health of our 
business. (Joint Statement, 2011, para. 3-4) 
This declaration of support from the groups representing content creators exemplifies the 
crux of the entertainment industries’ single argument for the legislation, which can be further 
simplified into one word: piracy. Although this statement was released shortly after the bill was 
proposed and prior to the technology industries’ protests, the sentiment it conveys is 
representative of the entertainment industries’ stance for the entirety of the legislation’s life. 
Most of SOPA’s advocates framed their arguments through a firm refusal to compromise, though 
a few expressed willingness to make adjustments to the bill in recognition of the collateral 
damage it would have had. Throughout the media coverage of the legislation, there were more 
than twice as many articles referencing the need to end digital piracy than there were noting a 
desire to find a compromise. Those who were averse to finding an alternative solution enforced a 
strategy of presenting only one argument, combating copyright infringement, while adamantly 
rejecting the truth of the opposition’s primary claims – albeit without evidence. They assumed 
that SOPA was the only solution to digital piracy, failing to consider the devastation the 
legislation would have had on the Internet and insisting that technology companies needed to be 
held accountable for facilitating illegal downloading. The few individuals who were open to 
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compromise, on the other hand, acknowledged the technology industries’ concerns and were 
open to accounting for them in negotiating an alternative approach. 
Media executives who displayed a reluctance to forfeit any of SOPA’s provisions seemed 
to view the legislation as a time-sensitive issue that needed to be passed immediately regardless 
of its consequences, rather than a matter affecting multiple parties that should be handled 
reasonably and efficiently. Proponents of the bill as it was originally presented cared much more 
about its intention “to curtail the illegal downloading and streaming of TV shows and movies 
online” than any of the technology industries’ fears (Wortham, 2012, para. 2). The Hill 
emphasized the entertainment executives’ claims that “online piracy [steals] billions of dollars 
from businesses and [destroys] jobs,” highlighting the way supporters focused only on how 
intellectual property theft affects media industries and almost entirely ignored these same 
anticipated costs on technology industries (Sasso, 2012b, para. 2). The New York Times also 
asserted that the lack of regulation impacts more than just the executives and allows copyright 
infringement to be “measured in less innovation and less economic activity,” causing “creators 
[to] lose hope of making a living from their creations” (Going After the Pirates, 2011, para. 3). 
Though websites and other opponents of the legislation argued the negative consequences SOPA 
would have had on Internet business models, proponents of the bill cited the similar industry 
effects of not imposing such legislation. Solely concerned about the perils of digital piracy rather 
than the threats the bill posed to other businesses, media industries presented a narrow reasoning 
for their stance. They offered a strong argument against online copyright infringement that 
supported the need for a law or system to eradicate the illegal behavior, but they failed to prove 
that SOPA was the best or only way to accomplish that goal. 
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In defending the bill, advocates drew on the need to protect intellectual property in order 
to save entertainment industries as opposed to identifying a particular merit of the legislation, 
such as a clause or method that would prove the bill effective in combatting digital piracy. 
Rather than explain how SOPA would be effective as a legislation in comparison to other ways 
of dealing with the issue, proponents of the bill focused exclusively on the benefits of their end 
goal, the elimination of copyright infringement. Arguing only that online piracy is a popular, yet 
illegal act that causes significant destruction to media industries, the bill’s supporters seemed to 
blindly enforce this claim without accounting for the fact that many opponents agreed with the 
need to curtail piracy, but not with the legislation’s approach. Often using words such as 
“necessary” or “need” to emphasize the bill’s importance, supporters tended to falsely assume 
that SOPA was the only way of combating piracy rather than the most sufficient means of doing 
so. Eager to enact any law that would make it more difficult for pirates to illegally access 
content, proponents seemed to believe that simply because the bill would be efficient in reducing 
piracy, it was essential to accomplishing this. 
Though opponents put forward valid evidence and detailed explanations as to how the 
legislation would have had disastrous effects on the Internet’s development, proponents placed 
their emphasis on the one argument of eliminating piracy, while shutting down criticisms without 
substantive reasoning. In response to technology industries’ concerns that SOPA’s ambiguous 
language would allow for loose interpretation, and thus unintended consequences for legitimate 
websites, advocates of the bill merely asserted that “their fears are groundless” (Nagesh, 2012, 
para. 2). Lamar Smith (R-TX), the U.S. Representative who first introduced the bill, was quoted 
several times throughout the publications maintaining that the legislation would only affect rogue 
websites that illegally host copyrighted content, not law-abiding platforms. In a letter to the 
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editor of The New York Times, Smith contended, “SOPA targets only foreign Web sites that are 
primarily dedicated to illegal and infringing activity. Domestic Web sites, like blogs, are not 
covered by this legislation” (Smith, 2012, para. 2). Though he repeatedly made this claim in 
response to technology industries’ argued concern with the bill, he offered no evidence to 
support it. Similarly, Michael O’Leary, Chairman of the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA), rejected the opposition’s arguments that the bill would lead to unreasonable burdens 
and overregulation, classifying “the rhetoric from the opposition” as an “inside the Beltway 
trick” (Johnson, 2011a, para. 11) and accusing opponents of “screaming regulation” to “curry 
favor with Republicans” (Nagesh, 2011b, para. 2). Writing off opponents’ fear as a scheme 
formulated to gain legislators’ support, O’Leary undermined criticisms of the bill without 
explanation. 
Advocates made similar statements in rejecting the opposition’s concern that SOPA 
would stifle innovation and violate the First Amendment right to free speech. Though no 
proponent offered evidence to combat the technology industries’ arguments, many invalidated 
the doubts by deeming them illegitimate or hypocritical. Contending that “there is no 
inconsistency between protecting free speech and endorsing this bill,” O’Leary labeled the 
websites’ anxiety over freedom of expression as “overblown” without providing reason to 
believe his claim (Nagesh, 2011b, para. 2). The Directors Guild of America similarly pleaded 
that they were “greatly offended that [their] advocacy…[had] turned into an implication that 
[they] promote censorship” (DeGennaro, 2012, para. 5). Rather than giving proof or insight into 
why they adamantly insisted that consumers and legitimate sites would not be harmed, the 
entertainment industries simply shut down the conversation, denying the validity of arguments 
made against the legislation.  
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Other SOPA supporters, though not offering evidence to falsify free speech concerns, 
dismissed them on the grounds of hypocrisy. Rupert Murdoch, Founder and CEO of News 
Corporation, tweeted in January 2012, “Nonsense argument about danger to Internet. How about 
Google, others blocking porn, hate speech etc.? Internet hurt?” (Carlson, 2012b, para. 9). While 
he did not deny the accusation that the legislation would have restricted free speech, Murdoch 
accused web firm executives of having devised algorithms that already censor users from other 
types of content, such as obscenities or offensive remarks. Legislators who supported the bill 
also cited similar practices of search engines “discerning what material infringes and what does 
not,” implying that the “free speech issue amounted to a double standard” (Johnson, 2011b, para. 
13). In an attempt to undermine technology industries’ arguments against the legislation, 
advocates either denied the criticisms or referenced instances with similar consequences, but 
failed to offer justification as to why the opposition’s claims were unsound. 
 In addition to rejecting opponents’ doubts about the bill, many entertainment executives 
were adamant that search engines and other websites linking to platforms that allow illegal 
access to copyrighted material need to take responsibility for facilitating piracy. Deeming any of 
the search engines’ methods of restricting intellectual property theft inefficient, Murdoch argued 
that copyright infringement is made easier by the sheer presence and large quantity of links 
available on Google. He noted the severity of this issue in a tweet, saying, “Just been to google 
search for mission impossible (sic). Wow, several sites offering free links. I rest my case” 
(Carlson, 2012a, para. 5). Though proponents insisted that legitimate websites would not be 
harmed by overregulation or censorship, according to The New York Times, they also contended 
that the technology industries had to be held accountable for “aiding and abetting thieves on a 
broad scale” (Carr, 2012, para. 12). Search engines permit illegal access to intellectual property 
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by offering links to websites that pirate content, and advocates of the legislation insisted that this 
feature be punished with severe consequences. 
Chris Dodd, Chairman and Chief Lobbyist for MPAA, explained the position that 
technology industries need to take responsibility for facilitating digital piracy by comparing the 
illegal act to a bank robbery. Dodd claimed that just because “a guy that drives the getaway car 
didn’t rob the bank necessarily” they are still “accessories” in the offense since they are guilty of 
getting the robber to and away from the scene of the crime and thus need to be held accountable 
for enabling the illegal action (Johnson, 2011c, para. 3). Advocates of SOPA argued that 
simplifying access to copyright infringement accelerates the process of illegally downloading 
content, and such offenders must be held responsible for playing that role. Cary Sherman, 
Chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America, expressed in a Q&A with 
Billboard that while he is “all for Internet freedom,” he could not stand for the “Internet 
anarchy” that results from “organizations that would just prefer to allow people to profit from 
piracy and creators’ rights to be stolen, rather than . . . interfere with . . . total freedom of the 
Internet" (Hau, 2011, para. 11). Sherman and other advocates insisted that the search engines and 
sites that feared SOPA’s impact on net neutrality had to consider their positions in exacerbating 
the digital piracy issue as well as their subsequent responsibility to act on it.   
 While the majority of publications cited supporters who tenaciously dismissed the 
technology industries’ contentions and insisted that search engines be held accountable for 
permitting access to illegal content, a handful of sources expressed a willingness to concede 
certain terms of the legislation and were more receptive to compromising with the opposition. 
Such proponents wanted to make revisions to SOPA rather than start from scratch and several – 
including Jonathan Lamy, Senior Vice President for Communications at RIAA – encouraged “all 
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players in the Internet chain who profess to care about copyright protections” to “come forward 
with meaningful solutions” (Nagesh, 2011b, para. 2). In a failed effort to appease some of the 
opponents’ criticisms by tightening the language, legislators unveiled an amended version of 
SOPA on December 15, 2011, a month before the bill’s failure. This new proposal removed a 
clause pertaining to Domain Name System blocking and made it so that the regulatory power 
was no longer in the hands of magistrate judges and, rather, the International Trade Commission 
(ITS), a more neutral party that has a much better understanding of trade policy and the Internet. 
The bill’s opponents, however, were evidently not convinced that technology industries were 
safe from the legislation’s anticipated effects. Despite the display of some advocates’ openness 
to compromise on SOPA’s provisions, the amendments were not significant enough to affect the 
adamancy of either side of the conversation. In fact, the arguments presented by both the 
proponents and opponents did not noticeably change within the legislation’s media coverage 
after the revisions were introduced.  
 
“Lessons They Learned”: SOPA Aftermath 
The tabling of SOPA at the end of January 2012 resulted in mixed reactions from both 
the advocates and the opponents of the legislation. Remaining unanimous on the need to 
eliminate digital piracy, most proponents’ initial reaction was to blame the bill’s failure on 
technology industries. Many of the entertainment executives and legislators who maintained their 
support of the bill accused web firms of spreading misinformation to their users and 
subsequently garnering an unfair growth in opposition. Though SOPA opponents labeled these 
allegations as misguided due to supporters’ ignorance about technology and the Internet, many 
web firm executives agreed that the prevalence of copyright infringement would need to be 
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addressed, and that a solution would require trusting the entertainment industries. Similarly, as 
media executives looked toward the future in an attempt to identify a more appealing approach to 
digital piracy for all implicated parties, their original reaction softened and many expressed a 
willingness to compromise with technology industries. 
As legislators withdrew their support for SOPA and it became evident that the bill would 
be placed on indefinite hold, advocates’ immediate response was anger and frustration directed at 
technology industries and their online protests. Referring to Wikipedia’s blackout as a “publicity 
stunt,” Lamar Smith (R-TX) accused the site of “spreading misinformation” and “promoting fear 
instead of facts” (Nagesh & Sasso, 2012, para. 2). SOPA supporters criticized online protests for 
relaying what they believed to be false information to users and thus garnering massive, 
unsubstantiated opposition to the legislation. Chris Dodd, Chairman and Chief Lobbyist for 
MPAA, similarly claimed that SOPA fell prey to “misinformation – spread both knowingly by 
those who have a financial interest in the status quo and by those who are well-intentioned but 
misled” (Johnson, 2012a, para. 17). Blaming the websites that led protests for deliberately using 
their position to convey lies and consequently gain support from innocent, susceptible users, 
entertainment executives believed that the bill failed undeservingly. 
Supporters of SOPA additionally defended the legislation by claiming that the web firms 
had a more attractive message than the entertainment industries. Proponents such as Dodd 
complained that “the tech sector was able to mobilize supporters by casting the issue as a 
personal one for . . . their consumers and users, while the showbiz message came across as one 
trying to protect its revenue stream” (McNary, 2012, para. 11). Advocates recognized that the 
information presented by the online protests made Internet users feel threatened, whereas the 
supporters’ message seemed irrelevant to entertainment consumers. They realized that the public 
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was more likely to join the side of the debate that directly impacted them than the side that 
appeared as a big business solely concerned with money. Further, an MPAA executive claimed 
that “the film and television industry . . . [is] not a victim that garners a lot of sympathy to the 
average citizen,” noting that many of the young people who illegally download content cannot 
perceive the extent to which their actions impact “all the stars [who] make big money” (Johnson, 
2012c, para. 7). Advocates of the bill argued that the technology industries garnered support for 
their stance as a result of deception, an appealing message, and the apparent widespread view of 
entertainment industries as wealthy and greedy. 
 Opponents rejected the notion that their online protests were spreading misinformation on 
the grounds that technology industries understand the Internet better than the bill’s proponents. 
Contrary to the supporters’ claims that the technology industries’ fears were unfounded, the 
opposition’s concern that the legislation would destroy the Internet was based on a 
comprehensive understanding of the inner-workings of the complex global computer network. 
According to The New York Times, critics of the advocates’ statements contended that “given 
both Congress’s and the entertainment industry’s historically wobbly grasp of technology . . . 
they [should not] be the ones re-engineering the Internet” (Carr, 2012, para. 26). The 
legislation’s opponents responded to supporters’ unsubstantiated dismissal of their concerns and 
accusation that they were disseminating false information with the rebuttal that technology 
industries are better able to perceive projected effects of the bill’s language than entertainment 
industries or legislators. Technology firms have an understanding of the features and affordances 
of the Web that cannot be matched by “old-school content groups [that] don’t understand the 
Internet” (Shapiro, 2012, para. 1). Since the websites’ concerns of unreasonable burdens, 
unintended consequences, stifled innovation, and free speech were based on this adept 
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knowledge of the Internet, they should not have been dismissed by those without similar 
competency. 
 Eventually, proponents of the bill resolved to a drastically different view of the 
legislation’s failure. Recognizing the potential of online protests and the strength of the 
technological community, entertainment executives came to terms with the need to compromise 
with web firms in order to construct a more thoughtful solution that appeases both media and 
technology industries’ desires to maintain profits. Several of the “highest-paid executives at the 
world’s largest media companies” such as Viacom, WME, RIAA, and MPAA discussed “lessons 
they learned from [the] failed industrywide attempt to pass antipiracy legislation,” and even 
admitted fault in the way they rushed the bill (Chozick, 2012, para. 2). Media industries’ 
approach in proposing and advocating for the bill was a hasty effort to eliminate piracy that 
could have had disastrous collateral damage on technology industries. Proponents, confident in 
their message, were unprepared for the considerable resistance they faced. The participatory 
nature of the Internet allowed technology industries to garner opposition to the legislation in 
unprecedented numbers, and media industries realized that without a change in strategy they 
would continue to face this challenge in the future. Learning from these mistakes, Dodd pushed 
for “closer cooperation between Hollywood and Silicon Valley” and noted that both sides 
“would be better served in the long run by finding that common ground” and avoiding “a 
repetition of what went on” during the SOPA debate (McNary, 2012, para. 1-3). Finally 
acknowledging that compromise is essential to finding an effective solution that would work for 
both sides, entertainment executives were committed to cooperating with technology industries 
to make progress on settling the digital piracy issue.  
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Looking toward the future, the media and technology industries even began proposing 
changes to their approach to make digital piracy deliberations more effective. Previous 
supporters of the bill, such as Dodd and Cary Sherman, Chairman and CEO of RIAA, found “the 
legislative route” to “no longer [be] appealing or practical” (Chozick, 2012, para. 17) and instead 
“emphasized cooperative agreements” (McNary, 2012, para. 4). The original proponents of 
SOPA suggested that the needs of both industries would be better met if they created a solution 
on their own terms, as opposed to involving government regulation. According to Daily Variety, 
technology industries also expressed a preference for collaboration, recognizing that a 
“significant lack of trust between Hollywood and Silicon Valley” has to be overcome and, in 
order to devise an efficient solution to digital piracy, “there will have to be unanimous 
agreement” that is “acceptable to all the stakeholders” (Johnson, 2012b, para. 11-17). Both sides 
agree that copyright infringement is an issue that needs to be solved, but prior to the SOPA 
controversy the entertainment and technology industries had different conceptions of how they 
should accomplish that feat. The failure of SOPA revealed that finding a more viable solution to 
digital piracy will require a willingness from the entertainment and technology industries to 
compromise; media industries will have to take a more flexible and thorough approach to 
deliberations, and technology industries must both acknowledge their role in facilitating piracy 
and agree to contribute to a solution. 
 
Discussion 
This study’s findings confirm that the relationship between the media and technology 
industries cannot be ignored in discussions of digital piracy. As technology and the Internet have 
developed, the number of ways to access and consume media content have grown exponentially. 
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These technological affordances not only disseminate media and make content more accessible 
to consumers, but they also facilitate intellectual property theft. Internet features that simplify 
access to music and videos, such as linking and participatory websites, are also used by pirates to 
illegally download, replicate, and share that same media content. Though entertainment 
industries are arguably the businesses most directly affected by digital piracy, the SOPA 
controversy made it evident that an effective solution must involve contributions from 
technology industries. Previous proposals to curtail online copyright infringement have been 
unsuccessful due to media industries and legislators’ ignorance about technology’s complexities 
and disregard for the destruction that the suggested solutions would have caused to both the 
landscape of the Internet and online companies’ business models. This case shows that any 
future attempt to combat digital piracy must be the result of a collaborative effort between the 
media and technology industries, accounting for the needs and priorities of both.   
Prior to the SOPA controversy, media industries seemed eager to enforce any legislation 
that would succeed in eradicating digital piracy, regardless of the collateral damage it would 
impose on technology industries. Since media industries rely on the Internet for the widespread 
distribution of content, it would be wise for entertainment executives to carefully consider 
technology industries’ needs when discussing solutions to online copyright infringement. Media 
and technology are indubitably linked, so a realistic response to digital piracy – an act that 
involves the use of technology’s affordances to illegally access media content – must be 
acceptable to both industries. Media industries, however, must be more mindful of the fact that 
copyright infringement does not directly impact the sales and revenue of technology industries. 
Consequently, web firms’ motives to finding a solution, unlike those of entertainment 
executives, are more ethical than financial. Advocates for eliminating digital piracy must 
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therefore adjust their expectations of the concessions that technology industries will make. 
Rather than require websites to modify their corporate practices to conform to their demands, it 
would benefit entertainment industries to be more realistic with their requests and more willing 
to forfeit a bit of control in the deliberation process. Similarly, technology industries must 
acknowledge and take responsibility for the role they play in digital piracy. Since the Internet’s 
affordances facilitate illegal access to media content, a feasible solution to curtailing digital 
piracy will require involvement from websites. Technology industries must make algorithmic 
adjustments, create a new system that restricts access to illegal sites, or agree to take on 
additional responsibility monitoring user-generated content. It may warrant changes in either 
industries’ business models, but in order to determine a more effective solution to piracy, the 
media and technology industries will need to compromise. 
 This case also shows that the relationship between the media and technology industries 
represents a broader communications issue. More than determining an effective solution to 
digital piracy, this study’s findings reveal the importance of attending to the different factions 
involved during the deliberation process. The knowledge that this matter affects multiple 
industries is essential to the structure of the debate, adding dimensions to an issue that has 
previously been viewed solely from the perspective of media industries. This study demonstrates 
that in addition to the solution that comes of it, the shape, texture, and movement of the debate 
are equally vital considerations to research on this topic. Value exists in taking this 
comprehensive approach, evaluating a topic from the perspectives of all implicated industries, in 
realms beyond intellectual property theft. The alignment of the technology and entertainment 
industries affects more than just how people download content; it influences the location, device, 
and frequency with which they consume it. Issues such as accessing the Internet on mobile 
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devices, the ability to share media content on social media, binge consumption on streaming 
services, and technology’s influences on social norms are other challenges that affect both media 
and technology industries. Similar to digital piracy, when negotiating the legality of streaming 
services or the use of mobile devices to access content, media and technology executives need to 
account for the effects that their decisions have on other industries’ products and services. 
Recognizing the structure of all involved businesses is essential to having productive 
conversations about the use of technology to access media content. 
 After the failure of SOPA, media and technology industries started to identify the need to 
compromise and even made some progress toward finding a successful solution to digital piracy. 
In February 2013, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) implemented a Copyright Alert System 
(CAS), a collaborative effort between both the technology and entertainment industries to 
combat piracy. This six strike warning initiative informed pirates that they were breaking the law 
and educated them on legal alternatives (Lesser, 2013). After the notices had been administered 
six times, ISPs had the option of either slowing down or revoking a user’s service. Due to its 
inefficiency in reducing peer-to-peer file sharing, however, this system was repealed in January 
2017 (Kravets, 2017). Despite its failure, the Center for Copyright Information released a 
statement noting the success of CAS in regards to “educating many people about the availability 
of legal content” and “issues associated with online infringement.” They also insisted that despite 
the end of this particular program, “the parties remain committed to voluntary and cooperative 
efforts” (Statement on the Copyright Alert System, 2017, para. 2). Though the industries’ first 
attempt at collaboration did not completely eradicate the digital piracy issue, it was a step in the 
right direction. With continued commitment to protecting intellectual property and willingness to 
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compromise, the media and technology industries will likely continue to find effective solutions 
by trial and error. 
This cooperation between industries has also been displayed over the years following 
SOPA by the implementation and growth of streaming services, such as Netflix and Spotify. 
These services reflect a change in media industries’ practices, providing consumers with legal 
and convenient methods of consuming content that researchers speculate are the reasons for a 
recent reduction in digital piracy (Titcomb, 2016). As previously noted, digital piracy scholars in 
their research on copyright law and entertainment executives in media publications on SOPA 
have deemed legislation and other negative consequences ineffective in deterring illegal 
downloading. The recent shift in industries’ practices illustrated by the widespread use of 
streaming services in place of a la carte alternatives has demonstrated the seemingly successful 
use of positive incentives to discourage piracy. The popularity of services such as Netflix and 
Spotify makes it apparent that the media and technology industries are collaborating on more 
than just digital piracy issues, allowing both sides to develop their businesses without interfering 
with the others’ practices. Though copyright infringement remains a primary concern for 
entertainment industries, CAS and streaming services represent promising, progressive 
movement toward a more effective digital piracy solution that does not disrupt web firms’ 
business models.  
 This case shows the value of studying the perspectives of media and technology 
industries on digital piracy in tandem. It also demonstrates the significance of analyzing failed 
legislative responses to both online copyright infringement and other communications issues 
regarding the relationship between these industries. For instance, researchers could also perform 
a discourse analysis on CAS or the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), 
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another 2011 unpassed bill that had the intention of protecting intellectual property on the 
Internet. Insight into the discourses surrounding these failed approaches may reveal other 
industries’ involvement or identify additional factors that must be considered in the deliberation 
processes. Industries can learn from such research and make informed decisions based on 
scholars’ findings. Accounting for the input of all implicated parties in both scholarly literature 
and industry debates could facilitate the production of an effective solution and contribute to 
avoiding controversies similar to the one following SOPA’s introduction. 
While this study takes a comprehensive approach by examining the stakes involved in 
digital piracy for both media and technology industries, scholars could also thoroughly analyze 
the audiences’ perspectives on proposed solutions. Audiences and consumers are key elements of 
both media and technology industries’ decision-making processes and would thus add another 
crucial element to consider in digital piracy discussions. For instance, scholars could observe or 
interview consumers to identify their consumption values and practices. This would allow 
researchers to analyze the issue from a leisure and entertainment perspective in addition to a 
business standpoint. Though technology and media industries strive for innovation, they need to 
also consider consumer satisfaction and receptiveness, which could be studied and theorized by 
scholars. Data and analysis on consumers’ feelings toward digital piracy and how that affects 
their media consumption habits would allow industries to evaluate potential copyright 
infringement solutions from not just other industries’ perspectives, but from their audiences’ as 
well. Integrating these into future deliberations about digital piracy will better allow media and 
technology industries to take a holistic approach in determining an efficient solution that does 
not disrupt either industries’ practices. 
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